The prices of exchange-traded funds can deviate significantly from their net asset values, in spite of the arbitrage mechanism that allows authorized participants to create and redeem shares for the underlying portfolios. The deviations are larger in funds holding international or illiquid securities where net asset values are most difficult to determine in real time. To control for stale pricing of the underlying assets, I introduce a novel approach using the cross-section of prices on groups of similar ETFs. I find that significant ETF mispricings remain in many asset classes. Active trading strategies exploiting such inefficiencies produce substantial abnormal returns before transaction costs.
prices which add up to the NAV of the fund. 1 If the ETF price is higher than the NAV, the investor can do the reverse, buying the underlying portfolio, submitting it to the fund sponsor in exchange for creating new ETF shares, and selling the new ETF shares at the higher price. This allows an investor to earn an arbitrage profit, minus the transaction costs of buying or selling the underlying portfolio. The efficiency of ETF prices therefore would be expected to depend on the transaction costs and any other limits to arbitrage that might deter arbitrageurs from trying to profit from a mispricing.
Transaction costs are very low for trading U.S. large-cap stocks such as those in the S&P 500 index, so an ETF based on such an index should be efficiently priced. In contrast, trying to arbitrage a mispricing on an ETF holding high-yield corporate bonds would involve trading illiquid securities in the over-the-counter market and facing higher transaction costs due to trading commissions and price impact. This friction is simple for an investor to understand, but avoiding it while trading is harder: the investor may still end up buying at a premium or selling at a discount.
Another issue complicating the arbitrage trade is that the officially published NAV may not fully reflect the current value of the ETF portfolio due to stale pricing.
NAV is computed based on the latest closing prices for the underlying securities, or the latest bid prices in fixed-income markets (e.g., Gastineau (2010) and Tucker and Laipply (2010) ). This can be a problem for illiquid securities such as high-yield bonds or for securities traded in international markets such as Japan where the trading day ends even before it begins in the U.S. Hence, estimating the true NAV, as distinct from the published NAV, becomes a more complicated task. Furthermore, in the case of international securities traded in different time zones, it may not even be possible to enter into simultaneous offsetting transactions involving ETF shares and the underlying portfolio. These concerns are likely to reduce the effectiveness of arbitrage and to allow for greater mispricings in ETFs.
In this paper, I start by computing the premiums (positive or negative) of ETF prices relative to NAVs on all categories of funds traded in the U.S. market. I also document their time-series evolution to see if the efficiency of the market has changed over time. Most importantly, I introduce a novel approach to address the stale pricing issue: I sort funds into groups with nearly identical underlying portfolios, and I use the average market price of the group as a real-time proxy for the true underlying value of funds. Any cross-sectional dispersion of an ETF price around its group mean is therefore likely to be explained by mispricing rather than stale pricing. Due to the recent dramatic growth of the ETF sector, I focus mostly on the last four years of data from January 2007 to December 2010, as older data may be a poor guide to the present situation in the ETF marketplace.
I find that the average premium across all funds has been only 14 basis points (bp), so on average ETFs are neither underpriced nor overpriced, in contrast to closedend funds where the absence of share creation and redemption allows some funds to trade 10-20% or more below their NAVs. But the volatility of the ETF premium has been nontrivial at 50 bp, meaning that with 95% probability a fund is trading at a premium from about -100 bp to +100 bp; the value-weighted numbers are only slightly smaller. This range is certainly economically significant and a potential source of concern for an ETF investor.
There is considerable variation in the premiums across asset classes: diversified U.S. equities and U.S. government bonds are fairly safe for investors, exhibiting volatilities of 10-20 bp around NAVs, whereas international equities exhibit volatilities of 50-130 bp around NAVs. Illiquid U.S.-traded underlying securities such as long-term municipal bonds and corporate bonds also have volatilities of 50-160 bp around NAVs.
Perhaps surprisingly, even some sector funds predominantly based on liquid U.S. equities have volatilities of 30-70 bp.
Substantial volatility remains even if we adjust for bid-ask spreads. If we make the extreme assumption that the true market price is anywhere between the bid-ask spread so that the absolute value of the premium is minimized, the average valueweighted volatility decreases by only 10%, with more extreme numbers within some categories.
While stale pricing explains part of the premiums, it certainly does not explain all of it. When we compute the volatility of the premium relative to the mean of a group of similar ETFs, we still find nontrivial volatility. The volatility of the premium is 38 bp in the full sample and ranges from 20 to 70 bp for international equity funds.
Furthermore, a trading strategy built to exploit these cross-sectional differences in ETF premiums generates attractive profits: on a simple unlevered long-short strategy, the historical Carhart alpha is 11% per year and the annualized information ratio is 5.2 using all the ETFs, and the alpha rises to 26% per year if we only use the categories that are most prone to mispricing. This provides a convenient summary statistic of the inefficiencies that remain in the ETF market and potential pitfalls for the average ETF investor.
Positive premiums on ETFs lead to more share creation, and vice versa for negative premiums, indicating that arbitrageurs are actively using the ETF share creation and redemption process to trade against these mispricings. Once new shares are created, there is downward price pressure on the same day and the subsequent two days which in turn pushes positive premiums back toward zero.
Over time, the cross-sectional dispersion in ETF premiums peaked during the financial crisis in late 2008, but it has remained at a nontrivial level through the end of 2010. It is correlated with the VIX index and TED spread which are proxies for the availability of arbitrage capital, as well as the average closed-end fund discount which can proxy for investor sentiment. This paper is certainly not the first in the literature to investigate the efficiency of ETFs as investment vehicles. Early references include Ackert and Tian (2000) , Elton, Gruber, Comer, and Li (2002) , and Poterba and Shoven (2002) . The study perhaps closest to this paper is by Engle and Sarkar (2006) who analyze similar questions about ETF premiums relative to NAVs. However, the explosive growth of the ETF market has raised the question of whether the findings of the previous studies still hold in today's market: for example, Engle and Sarkar (2006) use a sample of 37 ETFs which ends in 2000, but since then the size of the ETF market has grown almost 30-fold to about a thousand U.S.-traded ETFs with about a trillion dollars in assets at the end of 2010.
Worldwide, the number of ETFs reached 2,847 with an estimated $1.4 trillion in assets in July 2011; if we include exchange-traded notes (ETNs) and exchange-traded currency and commodity funds, the total number of exchange-traded products was 4,017 with assets of $1.6 trillion.
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As ETFs have grown from a niche product to a rapidly growing and significant fraction of the entire market, it seems warranted to investigate the current status of their pricing efficiency.
Methodologically, this paper also adds a new and simple approach to dealing with the stale pricing issue without having to make any assumptions about the price dynamics of the underlying portfolio. In other tests where I do use NAV data, I have a broad sample that covers 99% of ETF assets and 97% of the number of funds, including ETFs from all fund families, in contrast to some studies that only use data for iShares funds.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section I describes my data sources. Section II provides some preliminaries on ETFs and the dramatic growth of the ETF sector.
Section III presents the results on ETF premiums relative to the funds' official NAVs.
Section IV presents my approach to addressing the stale pricing issue and presents the results on remaining mispricings. Section V concludes.
I. Data
I combine six sources of ETF data. The first source is CRSP, which I use for daily prices and returns. CRSP covers all live and dead ETFs, including commodity funds, but not ETNs. The second source is Bloomberg, which covers daily NAV data for essentially all live funds as of April 2010 or later, going back to the inception of each fund. Since 1995, the Bloomberg data include anywhere from about 60% to 97% of all ETFs and 90% to 99% of all ETF assets. The third source is iShares, covering daily The sixth data source is the consolidated NYSE TAQ data, which has been aggregated from individual transactions and quotes to five-minute intervals. I use it for intraday calculations, including bid-ask spreads, prices, and trading volume, although the bulk of the analysis does not use intraday data.
To mitigate concerns about illiquidity of the shares of smaller ETFs, I compute the end-of-day price as the average of the bid price and ask price at market close, instead of using the official closing price (i.e., the latest transaction price). I also compute all ETF returns from the bid-ask midpoint (plus dividends) rather than using the returns given in CRSP, following the recommendations of Engle and Sarkar (2006) .
In some parts of my analysis, I eliminate funds that have less than $10 million in assets or less than $100,000 in daily trading volume.
II. Background on ETFs

A. Growth of the ETF Sector
Before ETFs, most individual investors were effectively limited to investing in open-end and closed-end mutual funds or directly in individual stocks. Relative to mutual funds, ETFs have advertised several benefits to investors. Their fees are generally comparable to or even lower than those of the lowest-cost index funds. The ETF structure allows funds to minimize portfolio turnover, thus generating lower trading costs than comparable open-end index mutual funds. They can be more tax-efficient.
They offer intraday trading, they can be sold short or bought on margin, and they can all be purchased conveniently on the investor's existing brokerage account. Apparently investors have paid attention, and the sector has risen to become a serious challenger to the existing mutual fund industry. Table I describes my sample of ETFs in 2010, showing the whole distribution of some key characteristics. The median fund has $91 million in assets, but the distribution is heavily skewed in terms of asset size with the largest fund (SPY) accounting for $91 billion. Dollar trading volume is even more skewed, with the median fund trading about $1 million per day and the most active fund (SPY) trading $24 billion per day. Relative to a fund's market capitalization, daily trading amounts to about 1.7% for the median fund, implying about 400% turnover per year, but the most active funds can even trade more than their market cap in a single day. The median ETF closing bid-ask spread is 14 basis points (bp), but it varies from as low as 1 bp for the most liquid funds to as high as several percent for the least liquid funds, reflecting the wide disparity in trading volume across funds. Unlike a regular stock where market makers have to post a large spread to offset the adverse selection problem they face (i.e., they may lose money trading with someone who has private information), an ETF is valued based on fully observable components, so the ETF spreads should generally be lower than they would be for a stock with similar trading volume.
B. Cross-sectional ETF Characteristics
The median fund is generating a 29% annual turnover by its own trading. Some turnover is unavoidable even for passive funds because of changes in the underlying index. Especially funds holding front-month futures positions need to trade often as they roll over their positions regularly, whereas a diversified large-cap equity index requires little turnover if the fund uses only in-kind creations and redemptions. The annual expense ratio of a median fund stands at 54 bp of net assets, varying from 7 bp to 150 bp across funds.
Four years earlier in 2006, the median fund was almost 40% bigger, it had 50% greater trading volume, and its bid-ask spread was slightly lower. This reflects the fact that during the recent proliferation of ETFs, fund sponsors have been testing investor appetite for a variety of products, including competing products in old categories as well as new products in small niche categories which have not even been intended for a broad investor base.
C. Share Creation and Redemption
To create new ETF shares, an investor must be an "authorized participant" such as a broker-dealer who has entered into an agreement with the ETF trustee. ETF shares are created in "creation units" of usually 50,000 or 100,000 shares, with dollar values typically ranging from $300,000 to $10 million. Most creations occur as in-kind transactions: the investor submits a portfolio that matches the specifications given by the fund trustee before the end of the trading day, and new ETF shares are created for him at the end of the trading day. The trades are settled three days later.
The authorized participant must pay a fixed dollar fee, usually $500 to $3,000, for each creation transaction regardless of the number of creation units involved. For SPY, its fixed fee of $3,000 would currently amount to about 5 bp for a single creation unit worth about $6 million, or 1 bp for five creation units worth about $30 million. The process is similar for share redemptions, with identical fees. These transaction costs, combined with the costs of trading the underlying securities, would therefore be expected to set the boundaries of how much the ETF price can diverge from its NAV.
Some ETFs also allow investors to create and redeem creation units in cash.
These transactions occur at the fund's published end-of-day NAV, much like purchases of open-end mutual funds, where the fund has the responsibility to use the new cash to purchase more securities for its underlying portfolio. However, in ETFs the investor who creates new shares has to pay additional fees to cover the transaction costs incurred by the fund. These fees vary widely: for example, ProShares ETFs, based on relatively liquid underlying assets, charge only 1-2 bp additional fees for in-cash creation, whereas the iShares High Yield bond fund (ticker: HYG) may charge up to 3% for in-cash creations and 2% for redemptions, reflecting the higher transaction costs of the underlying assets. In-kind share creation exposes an arbitrageur to two risks: the timing risk due to non-simultaneous purchase and sale of the ETF shares and the underlying portfolio, and also the unpredictable transaction costs especially in illiquid assets. In-cash creation eliminates these risks but it can be much more expensive and is not always available. As 3 These fees represent the maximum possible cost for an authorized participant. If the actual transaction costs are lower, the authorized participant will typically have to pay only the smaller amount. If transaction costs are expected to be higher than these maximum amounts e.g. during a temporary lack of liquidity in the underlying market, the fund sponsor may refuse cash creations altogether. a result, even if arbitrageurs compete aggressively in this activity, their actions are likely to leave some nontrivial mispricings at least for the types of ETFs where the limits to arbitrage are most significant. Table II The other columns in the table are all conditional on creations or redemptions taking place that day. The median number of shares created or redeemed was 100,000, which is a common size for one or two creation units, while the mean was 338,000
shares. The median dollar value of these transactions was $4 million, whereas the mean was again higher at $14 million. As a fraction of a fund's total assets, the median transaction accounted for 5%, while the mean accounted for 21%. Relative to the daily ETF trading volume, these are much larger fractions, with the median and mean creation or redemption transaction accounting for 237% and 1,565% of daily volume, respectively.
Economically, these numbers indicate that the size of a creation unit is indeed large for a typical ETF. Even if an arbitrageur participates in every single trade in a fund and always on the same side, in most funds it would still need several days to accumulate a position that would be large enough to offset the creation or redemption of a single creation unit. This makes it harder to arbitrage small mispricings by using the ETF share creation and redemption process, thus making it less surprising if prices do not closely track NAVs for many funds. The fund categories most affected by infrequent creations and redemptions are the ones with the most difficult-to-trade underlying assets, including international equities as well as corporate and muni bonds, whereas funds holding U.S. equities and U.S. government bonds experience more creation and redemption activity on average.
The bottom two panels of the table show the same statistics across funds sorted into quintiles by market cap and trading volume. The larger and more traded ETFs have much more frequent creations and redemptions. In spite of the larger size of creations for larger funds, such creations account for a much smaller fraction of daily trading volume, which makes arbitrage activity easier in these funds.
III. ETF Prices Relative to NAVs
A. Sample and Methodology
I define the ETF price premium as the percentage deviation of the ETF price from the NAV. For simplicity I call it a premium even if it is negative, i.e., when the ETF is trading at a discount. I weed out a handful of premiums greater than 20% in absolute value, as they are all due to data errors, but in general my data sources seem relatively clean.
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I focus on the premiums in the last four years of the data, from 1/2007 to 12/2010, for two reasons. First, due to the dramatic growth of the ETF industry in the last few years (see Figure 2) , this is the only way I can get a broad cross-section of funds. Second, it would be questionable to assume that the pricing of ETFs has not changed in any way while the business has undergone such an explosive period of growth, so investigating the most recent data is likely to be more informative about the current state of ETF pricing. Table III 
B. Estimates of Premiums
The average premium is only 14 bp, which indicates that the typical fund is neither underpriced nor overpriced. However, the time-series volatility of that premium is 50 bp, which indicates that ETF prices fluctuate considerably around NAVs even if the average level is correct. The value-weighted average volatility is similar at 43 bp, so the result is not limited to smaller funds.
Economically, the equal-weighted number tells us that the typical fund is trading in a range from -100 bp to +100 bp around its NAV with a 95% probability. Given that some funds are competing for cost-conscious investors by shaving a few basis points off their fees to bring them even below 10 bp per year, there is a risk that some investors are simultaneously overlooking a potentially much bigger cost due to an adverse premium on the transaction price. Conversely, transacting at an attractive price can offset the cost of investing in a higher-fee ETF.
The smallest premiums exist in diversified U.S. equities, U.S. government bonds, and shortest-maturity bonds in general. At the other end of the spectrum, international equities, international bonds, and illiquid U.S.-traded securities such as municipal bonds and high-yield bonds exhibit volatilities of up to 157 bp, which translates to a 95% confidence interval of as high as 6%. This is qualitatively consistent with the limits to arbitrage hypothesis, since the securities with the highest transaction costs and the least transparent (and most stale) NAVs have the most volatile premiums. But can these costs really explain the entire magnitude of the premiums? One piece of evidence comes from U.S. sector funds: in spite of being liquid and transparent, some of those categories have volatilities around 30-50 bp, which cannot be explained by stale pricing. To give some idea of transaction costs in the ETFs themselves, the last two columns in the table show their bid-ask spreads. The equal-weighted average is 41 bp while the value-weighted average is only 6 bp, indicating the tremendous trading activity the larger ETFs have generated. The value-weighted numbers show the lowest bid-ask spreads of 3-5 bp for diversified U.S. equity funds, U.S. government bonds, and commodities, and 5-20 bp for most other categories with at least $1 billion in assets.
The column labeled "VW min" shows the value-weighted volatility of the premium controlling for the bid-ask spread. I pick the "true" closing price of the ETF between the bid and the ask price to minimize the absolute value of the premium.
Intuitively, this is the premium in a world where investors always buy at the ask and sell at the bid. By construction, the volatility of the premium goes down with such an extreme assumption, but only from 43 bp to 39 bp for value-weighted results.
C. Premiums and Share Creations
Any material positive premium in an ETF can be exploited by a market maker (authorized participant) who sells shares in the market and then transacts with the ETF to create a corresponding number of creation units of shares at NAV, and vice versa for negative premiums. What do historical data suggest about how ETF market makers actually respond to premiums? Table IV shows share creations on day t as a function of lagged end-of-day premium, with redemptions counted as negative creations. Creations are expressed as a fraction of the average daily trading volume during the same month. Standard errors are computed with double-clustered standard errors across both funds and time, and tstatistics based on them are reported in parentheses. This takes into account persistent fund-specific effects where one fund is trading at a persistent premium, e.g. due to strong inflows combined with illiquid underlying assets, and it also allows premiums to be correlated across similar funds within the same time period.
I find that past premiums positively predict future share creations up to about 10 daily lags (two weeks), with the strongest effect coming from the prior two days. A oneday premium of 1% on a fund would lead to a 3.5% increase in shares outstanding relative to the daily trading volume, and a more persistent one-week premium of 1% would increase shares outstanding by 6% of daily volume. The effect is statistically highly significant. This indicates that market makers indeed respond to nonzero premiums within 1-10 days by creating or redeeming ETF shares.
Within style categories, the coefficients are about twice as large for U.S. diversified equity funds, perhaps reflecting their more accurate NAV data. However, the accuracy of NAV data alone cannot explain differences across categories, because international bond funds have an even larger coefficient and international equity funds are about average. The significance of the results is very similar if I scale share creations by shares outstanding instead of average trading volume, or if I only include funds above $100M in assets.
Panel A of Table V shows how premiums respond to share creations and redemptions. Creations and redemptions in the same day immediately affect the premium, although by only a small amount: if a market maker creates enough new shares to match the daily trading volume (as we saw in Table II , the median creation is actually 2.4 times daily ETF volume), that reduces the premium by about 1 bp by the close of trading, which is statistically significant. Over the following two days, creations continue to reduce the premium by another 1 bp; subsequently they have no effect on the premium. This suggests that market makers offload their newly created ETF shares in the secondary market immediately before and after the creation process, and thus the price pressure from the new shares arises contemporaneously within about one day of share creation. However, the relatively small size of the effect suggests that shares are created and redeemed for many other reasons besides arbitrage; for example, sometimes large investors prefer to trade directly in the underlying securities in an effort to avoid having a large price impact on the ETF market, and in such cases the newly created or redeemed shares would not be traded at all in the secondary market and thus would not affect the premium on the ETF.
Panel B of Table V shows the long-term relationship between creations and the level of the premium. Creations in the prior three days all very significantly predict the level of the premium. In fact, the cumulative creations over the prior one, three, and six months all significantly predict the level of the premium. One explanation for this persistence in creations and premiums is that funds experiencing steady inflows trade at a premium; presumably investor demand pushes the ETF price to a premium, which then incentivizes market makers to create more ETF shares, but not so aggressively that they would eliminate the premium that is generating their own arbitrage profits.
Similarly, the reason an ETF is shrinking is that a market maker is redeeming shares, which is a profitable trade only when it has first purchased those ETF shares in the public market at a discount.
IV. Cross-Sectional Dispersion in ETF Prices
A. Methodology
To resolve the issue with staleness in published NAVs, Engle and Sarkar (2006) propose three econometric models that allow them to estimate the true NAV. This is certainly a reasonable approach, but such models always require assumptions about the price processes involved. In contrast, I use the information in the cross-section of ETFs, 
To reduce the impact of the smallest funds on the results, I eliminate funds below $10 million in assets, as well as funds with daily trading volume less than $0.1 million.
This reduces my sample size from 1,078 to 904 funds in 2007-2010. However, another 500 funds are dropped because I cannot find close enough substitutes for them (funds tracking the same or very highly correlated index), which leaves the total number of funds at 404. This still covers 84% of all ETF assets, so from an investment perspective the qualifying sample can be considered fairly comprehensive. shown side-by-side using both NAV data and the cross-sectional peer group method because the sample is slightly different so the NAV premiums will not be identical to the ones in 
B. Estimates of Premiums
C. Evolution of Mispricings over Time
One way to measure the efficiency of ETF prices at any point in time is to compute the cross-sectional standard deviation of ETF premiums. This is shown in and three different proxies of arbitrage capital: the VIX volatility index, the TED spread, and the average closed-end fund discount. The TED spread is defined as the difference between three-month LIBOR (or Eurodollar) and T-bill rates, which is the premium that a large financial institution would pay for unsecured lending over the true risk-free rate to finance its trading activity (e.g., Brunnermeier, Nagel, and Pedersen (2009)). The closed-end fund discount is computed at the end of each trading day as an equal-weighted average discount relative to NAV across all U.S.-listed closed-end funds.
It has been used as a measure of investor sentiment (Baker and Wurgler (2006) ), but it is also plausible that some of the same arbitrageurs operate in both ETF and closed-end fund markets, implying a potentially close relationship between the closed-end fund discount and the ETF premiums and discounts.
In Panel A, I find that all three measures are related to ETF premiums. In Panel B, I find that daily changes in each measure similarly predict daily changes in ETF premiums, although with slightly lower statistical significance. The most significant predictors are the VIX index and the closed-end fund discount: Ten percentage point increase in VIX increases the dispersion in ETF premiums by 18 bp, and one percentage point increase in the closed-end fund discount increases it by 5 bp. Hence, the funding costs of arbitrageurs and the riskiness of the overall market environment do seem to matter for the efficiency of ETF prices. Furthermore, the efficiency of ETF prices is related to the deviations of closed-end fund values from their NAVs.
D. Profitability of Active Trading Strategies
If ETFs are never mispriced, then any attempt to trade on apparent mispricings will fail to produce a positive alpha even before transaction costs. Hence, the returns to an active trading strategy serve as a convenient summary statistic about the efficiency of market prices. The measurement of the cross-sectional price premium in the previous section naturally lends itself to an active trading strategy: buy funds trading at a discount relative to their peer group and short funds trading at a premium once the gap becomes sufficiently wide. I assume trading once at the end of each day using the bid-ask average price at the close. Investigating the trading more closely, I find that the profits tend to come from international funds and illiquid underlying securities, consistent with the results in Table   VI , whereas diversified U.S. equities, U.S. Treasury bonds, and very short-term bonds tend to produce very low and occasionally even negative returns. Sector funds are somewhere in the middle, with some sectors priced more efficiently than others. When I drop diversified U.S. equities and Treasury bonds, the Carhart alpha rises to 14.36% (t = 9.98) per year, although volatility also rises slightly and reduces the impact on the information ratio. Excluding also the sector funds, the Carhart alpha rises to 26.12% (t = 9.42) per year, again with a similar information ratio of 4.78. Economically, this means that my simple rule identifies mispriced ETFs that will converge to their fundamental values at a rate of 10 bp per day. As most positions are held for longer than a day, this implies that the level of mispricing can rise to a multiple of that.
These returns to active strategies seem extremely attractive. However, a real-life implementation of the strategy adds a few potential complications: First, there may not be enough trading volume in some ETFs to make the strategy interesting. Second, even if trading volume is sufficiently high, it may occur at different times during the day for different funds, and this nonsynchronicity may introduce the false appearance of profitability. Third, the profits are sensitive to transaction costs, so the execution strategy plays a key role.
To address these concerns, I repeat the calculations with an intraday dataset using five-minute periods from 9:30am to 4:00pm. I construct a real-time signal based on currently observable prices and then trade subsequently based on that, which fully addresses potential issues with nonsynchronous trading. I also recompute trading profits assuming trading at actual transaction prices (five-minute volume-weighted average price) and with a maximum participation rate of 10%. This participation rate constraint on maximum trading volume implies that larger portfolios will be less profitable because there will not be enough volume to allow us to reach our ideal target position in some
ETFs. I find that the strategy remains profitable with intraday trading at actual transaction prices, but the capacity is somewhat limited: for example, the annual information ratio for a $100M long-short portfolio falls to about two. Furthermore, the strategy should not be executed aggressively because paying the full bid-ask spread (buying at the ask, selling at the bid) each time would significantly reduce its profitability; instead, it should be run as a passive market-making strategy with constantly updated limit orders, which is feasible since it uses a broad cross-section of hundreds of ETFs, potentially trading in any of them at any point in time. In fact, being a liquidity provider could even enhance the profits of the strategy up to a certain dollar capacity.
Regardless of one's view on whether the strategy appears attractive to an arbitrageur, an important implication for market efficiency remains: these trading profits document that the actual prices faced by ETF investors can differ significantly from the true value of the portfolio, thus presenting a potentially large hidden cost for ETF investors.
V. Conclusions
The dramatic growth of the ETF market in 2006-2010 has brought these investment vehicles to a large fraction of relatively unsophisticated individual investors.
It is easy for an investor to fall in the trap of focusing so much on the expense ratios of funds that the transaction price for ETF shares is overlooked. Given that U.S. ETF assets were about $1 trillion in 2010, any nontrivial mispricing in ETFs has the potential to represent a considerable wealth transfer from less sophisticated individual investors to more sophisticated institutional investors.
In this paper I have provided new empirical evidence on the current state of market efficiency in ETFs. Funds holding liquid domestic securities are priced relatively efficiently, whereas funds with international or illiquid holdings exhibit nontrivial premiums relative to NAVs, which is qualitatively consistent with the costs and uncertainty faced by arbitrageurs in these funds. More surprisingly, U.S. sector funds holding liquid domestic stocks also exhibit nontrivial premiums.
I also propose a new approach to detect mispricings on ETFs: measure them relative to the current market prices of a peer group of similar funds. This easily eliminates the potential problem of stale pricing. I find that this reduces the premiums on funds with international or illiquid holdings but still leaves them greater than the premiums on diversified U.S. equity funds, suggesting that nontrivial mispricing remain. This is confirmed by tests that involve the creation of an active trading strategy to exploit these mispricings, as the strategy produces economically substantial profits before transaction costs with a high degree of statistical significance.
ETFs are indeed convenient ways to access various market segments and generally come with low expense ratios, low turnover (implying low transaction costs paid by the fund), and high tax efficiency, so they have legitimately earned their place in the market. However, any cost-conscious individual investor should be aware of the potential to transact at a disadvantageous price and how to avoid it so that they can fully capture the benefits of these new investment vehicles. Figure 4 shows the total trading volume in all ETFs in five-minute periods throughout the day, averaged across all trading days in 2010. ETFs exhibit the same type of clustering as other securities: most of the volume occurs at the beginning and end of the trading day. In the middle of the day, trading intensity is about 30-50% of the value near the beginning and end of day, but it is certainly still at an economically meaningful level. Anecdotal observations suggest that some ETFs tend to search for their efficient prices early in the trading day and then become more efficiently priced toward the close, but this does not seem to hinder overall trading activity in the morning, when trading is essentially just as intense as at the end of the day.
Appendix A: Intraday Trading
As recently as in November 2008, many ETFs including SPY were trading on AMEX until 4:15pm, or 15 minutes longer than the equity securities on which the index values were based. Since then, exchange trading hours for ETFs have become standardized, starting at 9:30am and ending at 4:00pm EST, which presumably was driven by NYSE's acquisition of AMEX. Fixed-income ETFs still close at a different time than the underlying securities (4:00pm rather than 3:00pm for the bond market), and of course funds based on international securities will always close at different times than their underlying securities.
How liquid are ETFs in general? Figure 5 shows the average daily volume for all ETFs, plotted against their volume-weighted median intraday bid-ask spreads. To capture the liquidity that a typical investor would face, I specifically want to look at intraday spreads and not closing spreads, 9 and I compute the volume-weighted median for each fund to reflect the spreads at the time that actual trades are occurring. I find that all funds with bid-ask spreads below 10 bp also have at least $10M in daily trading volume; conversely, the dozen funds with over $1 billion in daily trading volume all have spreads at or below 10 bp. More surprisingly, among the funds with a median spread of about 100 bp or above, there are still several funds with over $1 million in trading The first two columns show the percentage of trading days when ETF shares were either created or redeemed by authorized participants transacting directly with the ETF. The next columns show the number of shares (in thousands) in each transaction, and the dollar value corresponding to it, conditional on a creation/redemption transaction taking place. The last columns show the size of the transaction relative to the total ETF shares outstanding and to the average daily trading volume that month. The median is computed first within a fund and then as another median across funds; the mean is similarly computed first within a fund and then across all funds. The time period is from 1/2007 to 12/2010. For all ETFs traded in the U.S., this table shows the number of ETFs and their last available market capitalization within each investment category. From this sample, funds are further assigned to peer groups of 2-8 funds tracking the same or very similar underlying index. For the funds that have a close match and therefore have been assigned to groups, the table shows the equal-weighted ("E group") and value-weighted ("V group") volatility of the deviation of the fund price from its group mean, averaged across funds within a category. For comparison, the volatility of the NAV premium for the same fund-dates is shown in adjacent columns ("E NAV" and "V NAV"). The market price is taken as the bid-ask average at the end of each trading day. The time period is 1/2007 to 12/2010. The volatility of premium is expressed in basis points. The dependent variable in Panel A is the cross-sectional standard deviation of the premium across all large ETFs at the end of each trading day. Large funds are defined as having at least $100 million in assets. The premium is computed relative to a peer group mean to eliminate any effects from stale pricing. The explanatory variables are the CBOE VIX volatility index, the spread between three-month LIBOR and Tbill rates, and the average equal-weighted discount (relative to NAV) on all U.S.-traded closed-end funds. Panel B shows similar regressions, except that both the dependent and independent variables are expressed as changes from the previous day. The t-statistics (in parenthesis) are based on Newey-West standard errors with five lags. The time period is 1/2007 to 12/2010.
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Figure 1. Premiums on similar ETFs.
The top panel computes the end-of-day price premiums on two similar muni bond funds, PZA and MLN, relative to their NAVs, and shows the difference in the two premiums over time. The bottom panel shows the difference in premiums for two similar junk bond ETFs, JNK and HYG. The figure shows the cross-sectional standard deviation of the premium across all ETFs at the end of each trading day. The premium is computed relative to a peer group mean to eliminate any effects from stale pricing. The other plotted time series are the CBOE VIX volatility index, and the cumulative return on the S&P 500 index. 
